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In re Parental Rights as to A.D.L., 133 Nev. Adv. Op. 72 (Oct. 5, 2017)1 
 
FAMILY LAW: PARENTAL RIGHTS 
 
Summary 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court held that (1) requiring a parent to admit guilt to a criminal act 
in order to maintain his or her parental rights violates that parent’s Fifth Amendment rights; and 
(2) substantial evidence must demonstrate that terminating parental rights is in the best interest of 
the children when a parent overcomes the presumptions in NRS 128.109(1)-(2). 
 
Background 
 
In April 2010, an anonymous person called respondent Clark County Department of Family 
Services (DFS) through its child abuse hotline alleging that Keaundra’s children were being abused 
and neglected because Keaundra’s infant child’s face had been burned. DFS investigated the 
allegations by interviewing Keaundra. During the initial interview, Keaundra explained that 
C.L.B., Jr. burned his face while Keaundra was preparing for work. She had left a hot iron on a 
dresser in the master bedroom. Keaundra’s two children, A.D.L. and C.L.B. Jr., remained in the 
master bedroom unsupervised. Keaundra heard the iron fall and came out of the adjacent bathroom 
to find that C.L.B., Jr. had been burned. A.D.L. told Keaundra that C.L.B., Jr. had “tried to kiss 
the iron.” Keaundra called her mother, a nurse, who advised Keaundra to put ointment on the injury 
and take C.L.B. Jr. to the emergency room if the burn blistered.  
Following the initial interview, DFS removed the children from Keaundra’s custody. Once 
the children were removed from Keaundra’s custody, Dr. Thomas A. Neuman, a physician, 
examined C.L.B., Jr.’s burn. Dr. Neuman determined that the injury healed well and did not find 
any evidence of abuse. In May 2010, DFS filed a petition for protective custody of A.L.D. and 
C.L.B. Jr. Keaundra entered a denial at the plea hearing. DFS responded by requesting that the 
children be placed with their maternal grandmother.  
At the following adjudicatory hearing, the hearing master admitted Dr. Neha Mehta’s 
testimony as a medical examiner regarding his professional opinion of C.L.B. Jr.’s injuries. Dr. 
Mehta reviewed photographs of the injuries and reported that the shape of the injury was 
inconsistent with an accident. He believed the iron had been intentionally held to C.L.B. Jr.’s face. 
Keaundra attempted to rebut Dr. Mehta’s testimony by offering Dr. Neuman’s report. However, 
the hearing master excluded Dr. Neuman’s report because the report was not a certified copy. 
Therefore, the hearing master concluded that Keaundra physically abused C.L.B. Jr., had 
medically neglected him, and had absconded. The hearing master recommended that the abuse and 
neglect petition be sustained and that A.D.L. and C.L.B. Jr. remain in DFS custody. The juvenile 
court considered and affirmed the hearing master’s recommendation. 
Following the juvenile court’s decision, Keaundra received a case plan that required her to 
maintain stable housing and income, complete parenting classes, and maintain contact with DFS. 
Keaundra was also required to complete a physical abuse assessment and “be able to articulate in 
dialogue with the Specialist and therapist(s) the sequence of events which result[ed] in physical 
abuse, as sustained by the Court, and how he/she will be able to ensure that no future physical 
abuse to [C.L.B.] Jr. occurs.”  
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One month later, DFS filed a petition to terminate Keaundra’s parental rights. Over the 
following six months, Keaundra demonstrated that she completed the parenting classes, 
maintained housing, had steady employment, and completed her assessment and therapy. DFS was 
satisfied with Keaundra’s progress and recorded that she had “successfully completed her case 
plan and has the knowledge and tools to effectively parent her children.” Nonetheless, DFS 
continued to recommend that Keaundra’s parental rights be terminated because she failed to admit 
that she abused C.L.B. Jr. when she held an iron to his face. Despite Keaundra’s nearly perfect 
compliance with the case plan, the district court terminated Keaundra’s parental rights to both 
children based on the hearing master’s recommendation and Keaundra’s failure to remedy the 
“circumstances, conduct, or conditions” that lead to C.L.B. Jr.’s removal. Further, the district court 
terminated her parental rights because of her “token efforts, failure of parental adjustment, and 
unfitness.” 
Keaundra immediately appealed that decision to the Court. The Court reversed the district 
court’s holding because it failed to admit Dr. Neuman’s report and remanded the case for a new 
trial on parental fault and the consideration of additional evidence. At the second trial, the district 
court admitted Dr. Neuman’s report, and Dr. Mehta once again testified. The district court 
reaffirmed its prior decision to terminate Keaundra’s parental rights largely because Dr. Mehta 
had credentials and compelling testimony that supported Keaundra deliberately placing the iron 
on C.L.B. Jr.’s face. Notably, the district court concluded that Keaundra “continued to insist that 
the burn was accidental in nature in spite of all physical evidence being to the contrary.” Keaundra 
appealed the district court’s holding. 
 
Discussion 
 
The district court’s termination of Keaundra’s parental rights constituted a violation of her Fifth 
Amendment right against self-incrimination  
 
 The Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination provides that “[n]o person… shall 
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”2 The Fifth Amendment protects 
individuals in civil proceedings from self-incrimination when answering official questions in any 
proceeding.3 Further, The United States Supreme Court has held that a state may not compel an 
individual to choose between the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination and another 
principal interest because “such a choice is inherently coercive.”4 Founded on the belief that “the 
parent-child relationship is a fundamental liberty interest,” the Nevada Supreme Court (“the 
Court”) emphasized that the termination of parental rights must be highly regarded.5 
 Although the state maintains an important interest in protecting the welfare of children, 6 
the Court agreed with various jurisdictions that the state may not threaten the loss of parental rights 
to compel a parent to admit to a crime.7 The state’s role is limited to evaluating if a parent has 
                                                        
2  See Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 462 (1981) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. V). 
3  Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 77 (1973). 
4  Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801, 805–08 (1977).  
5  In re Termination of Parental Rights as to N.J., 116 Nev. 790, 801, 8 P.3d 126, 133 (2000).  
6  See In re N.J., 116 Nev. at 802, 8 P.3d at 133; see also NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.005(2)(c) (2017). 
7  See, e.g., Dep’t of Human Servs. v. K.L.R., 230 P.3d 49, 54 (Or. Ct. App. 2010) (“[R]equiring an admission of 
abuse as a condition of family reunification violates a parent’s Fifth Amendment rights…”). 
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adjusted circumstances to ensure the child’s safe return.8 Moreover, the Court can require a parent 
to complete therapy as provided in a family reunification plan but the Court cannot explicitly 
require a parent to admit guilt.9 Courts violate a parent’s Fifth Amendment right when the parent 
is required to directly admit guilt or through a therapy program that mandates an admission of guilt 
to achieve family reunification.10 
 The Court focused on DFS’s six-month record that demonstrated Keaundra’s success in 
therapy which occurred without Keaundra’s admission of guilt. Despite Keaundra’s success in all 
aspects of her case plan, except the required admission of guilt, Keaundra could not fully comply 
with the case plan without admitting she committed a criminal act.11 Therefore, the district court 
violated Keaundra’s Fifth Amendment rights by terminating her parental rights when she refused 
to admit she intentionally caused C.L.B. Jr.’s injury.12 
 
There was not substantial evidence to support the district court’s decision to terminate Keaundra’s 
parental rights 
 
 For the second question, DFS must provide clear and convincing evidence that (1) 
terminating the parental rights is in the child’s best interest and; (2) parental fault exists. 13 
Additionally, the termination of parental rights is subject to strict scrutiny because it “is an exercise 
of awesome power that is tantamount to imposition of a civil death penalty.”14 Thus, the Court 
seeks substantial evidence when evaluating the district court’s findings of fact because parental 
rights are highly regarded.  
 
The district court abused its discretion in concluding that terminating Keaundra’s parental 
rights was in the children’s best interests 
 
 A parent may rebut NRS 128.109(2)’s presumption by providing a preponderance of 
evidence that termination is not in the child’s best interest.15 The Court weighs the interests of the 
children with the interests of the parents when deciding whether to terminate parental 
rights.16Additionally, NRS 128.107(2) requires the district court to consider the “physical, mental 
or emotional condition and needs of the child and the child’s desires regarding the termination, if 
the court determines the child is of sufficient capacity to express his or her desires.”17  
The Court found that the district court failed to consider the “physical, mental, or emotional 
condition and needs” of the children. Further, the record reflected a preponderance of evidence 
establishing that Keaundra rebutted NRS 128.109(2)’s presumption as demonstrated by her 
                                                        
8  See generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.107(3) (2017); In re M.C.P., 571 A.2d 627, 640 (Vt. 1989). 
9  In re A.W., 896 N.E.2d 316, 326 (Ill. 2008); In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d 144, 150 (Iowa 2002); In re J.W., 415 
N.W.2d 879, 883 (Minn. 1987) (“While the state may not compel therapy treatment that would require appellants to 
incriminate themselves, it may require the parents to otherwise undergo treatment.”).  
10  In re C.H., 652 N.W.2d at 150; In re P.M.C., 902 N.E.2d 197, 203 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009). 
11  See NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.508 (2015).  
12  See In re J.W., 415 N.W.2d at 882–83. 
13  In re Parental Rights as to A.J.G., 122 Nev. 1418, 1423, 148 P.3d 759, 762 (2006). 
14  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
15  In re Parental Rights as to J.D.N., 128 Nev. 462, 472, 283 P.3d 842, 849 (2012); see NEV. REV. STAT. 
§ 128.109(2) (2017) (establishing a presumption that terminating the parent’s parental rights is in the child’s best 
interest when the child has been placed outside the home for 14 of any consecutive months). 
16  In re N.J., 116 Nev. at 802, 8 P.3d at 134.  
17  NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.107(2) (2017). 
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financial support, regular contact with the children, and A.D.L.’s heightened desire to be reunited 
with her mother. Accordingly, the district court abused its discretion in determining that 
terminating Keaundra’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. 
 
The district court abused its discretion in concluding that there was clear and convincing 
evidence of parental fault 
  
 Parental fault is determined by considering factors such as whether a parent is unfit or 
failed to adjust,18 or merely made “token efforts” to maintain contact or support the child, prevent 
child neglect, be a fit parent, or “eliminate the risk of serious physical, mental or emotional injury 
to the child.”19 The Court presumes that a parent made only token efforts when the child is placed 
outside the home “for 14 months of any 20 consecutive months.”20 Further, a parent fails to adjust 
to the circumstances when the parent does not substantially comply with the terms of the case plan 
to reunite the family within six months after the children were placed or the case plan 
commenced.21 
 The Court emphasized that Keaundra maintained housing and employment, maintained 
contact with her children and DFS, provided financial support for her children, and complied with 
the mandated assessment and therapy to the therapist’s satisfaction. Notably, even DFS admitted 
that Keaundra was equipped with the proper knowledge and tools to parent the children. Aside 
from Keaundra refraining from the admission of physical abuse, she completed with the case plan 
in all regards. Thus, the district court abused its discretion in finding that Keaundra did not rebut 
the presumptions in NRS 128.109(1)(a) when the preponderance of evidence in the record clearly 
revealed otherwise. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court will not terminate a parent’s rights solely because the parent 
refuses to admit abuse because a forced admission violates the parent’s Fifth Amendment right. 
The district court violated Keaundra’s Fifth Amendment right when it terminated her parental 
rights solely because she refused to admit she caused C.L.B. Jr.’s injury. Further, the district court 
lacked substantial evidence to establish that terminating Keaundra’s parental rights was in the best 
interest of the children. Keaundra provided a preponderance of evidence to successfully rebut NRS 
128.109(1) and (2). Thus, the Court reversed the district court’s order terminating Keaundra’s 
parental rights. 
                                                        
18  NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105(1)(b)(3) (2017). 
19  NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.105(1)(b)(6)(I)-(IV) (2017). 
20  NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.109(1)(a) (2015). 
21  NEV. REV. STAT. § 128.109(1)(b) (2015). 
